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Better by far to risk the lives of one's own combatants than the lives
of "enemy" infants. This is a strenuous demand. But we haven't even
attempted to meet it.'
INTRODUCTION
Over a period of eleven weeks from March 24, 1999 until June 9,
1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") conducted a
bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
("FRY").2 Thirteen of NATO's nineteen members participated in the
operation,' which was conducted in the name of the alliance as a
whole,4 with the United States supplying most of the intelligence and
sixty-five to eighty percent of the aircraft and precision ordnance.'
NATO's stated justification for the campaign was to support "the
political aims of the international community: a peaceful, multi-
1. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Kosovo and the Just-War Tradition, in Kosovo:
CONTENDING VOICES ON BALKAN INTERVENTIONS 363, 365 (William Joseph
Buckley ed., 2000) [hereinafter, CONTENDING VOICES].
2. See Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the
Committee Established to Review the NA TO Bombing Campaign Against the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia, para. 1, at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/
nato06l300.htm (last visited June 13, 2000) [hereinafter Final Report].
3. Sean D. Murphy, Contemporamy Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 628, 632 (1999); Michael Ignatieff, The
Virtual Commander: How NA TO Invented a New Kind of War, NEW YORKER,
Aug. 2, 1999, at 30, 32; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, VOL. 12, NO. I(D), CIVILIAN
DEATHS IN THE NATO AIR CAMPAIGN 10 (2000) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH] (stating that the thirteen states were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States).
4. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NATO/FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA:
"COLLATERAL DAMAGE" OR UNLAWFUL KILLINGS? VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF
WAR BY NATO DURING OPERATION ALLIED FORCE It (2000), at
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/kosovo/index.html [hereinafter AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL]. There were some allegations that the United States was also car-
rying out a separate military operation of its own to support the NATO attacks. See
id. at 14.
5. See id. at 12; see also Ignatieff, supra note 3, at 30 (indicating that the other
members of the coalition made essential contributions to aircrews and garnered
political support for the operation).
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ethnic and democratic Kosovo in which all its people can live in se-
curity and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal
basis."6 In other words, NATO intervened primarily to end a hu-
manitarian crisis." This intervention came at some humanitarian cost.
Approximately 500 confirmed civilian deaths resulted from NATO's
bombing campaign,' and around 6,000 civilians were wounded.'
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
("Tribunal") decided in June 2000 not to investigate complaints
about NATO's conduct of the campaign. It has issued no indictments
in this regard. The Tribunal's decision was made having regard to
reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch con-
demning aspects of NATO's campaign under international law.'
Subsequently, in October 2000, the Independent International Com-
mission on Kosovo ("Commission") released its report accepting the
Tribunal's decision. However, the Commission noted that the Tribu-
nal was concerned with the narrow question of whether there was a
basis for charging particular individuals with crimes," and posited
that some aspects of the bombing campaign "seem vulnerable to the
allegation that violations might have occurred and depend, for final
assessment, on the availability of further evidence.""
This Critical Essay aims to evaluate NATO's conduct of the
6. LORD GEORGE ROBERTSON OF PORT ELLEN, Kosovo ONE YEAR ON:
ACHIEVEMENT AND CHALLENGE 11 (2000).
7. Javier Solana, Secretary-General of NATO. Fresh Cause fir Hope it the
Opening of the New Centur', in CONTENDING VOICES, supra note 1, at 21 ; Gen-
eral Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. The Strength of an
Alliance, in CONTENDING VOICES, supra note 1. at 253; ci Morton H. Halpern,
United States Department of State, Winming the Peace: .America's Goals in
Kosovo, in CONTENDING VOICES, supra note 1. at 227.
8. FinalReport, supra note 2, para. 53: HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3,
at 5 (noting that sixty-two to sixty-six percent of these deaths resulted from twelve
incidents).
9. See TIM JUDAH, Kosovo: WAR AND REVENGE 264 (2000).
10. See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. supra note 4; HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 3.
11. See INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo
REPORT 178 (2000), available at http:i/www.kosovocommission.org reports
[hereinafter INDEPENDENT COMMISSION].
12. See id. at 5.
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bombing campaign in light of the Tribunal's decision, and to derive
lessons and recommendations from the manner in which the cam-
paign was conducted for the protection of civilians in future cases of
military interventions on humanitarian grounds. The discussion be-
low focuses on civilian deaths and injuries caused by the bombing,
largely ignoring issues concerning civilian property and infrastruc-
ture, the huge numbers of refugees arising from the Kosovo conflict,
and the environmental damage caused by NATO." The Essay com-
mences by explaining the decision of the Tribunal, and then sepa-
rates the issues of the legality of the use of force by NATO on the
one hand, from the legality of the manner in which force was used on
the other. The bulk of this Essay is concerned with the latter issue.
The general obligations of NATO in conducting the campaign are
then outlined, followed by a detailed examination of five specific in-
cidents of bombing.
I. DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL PROSECUTOR
In mid-1999, the Tribunal began receiving allegations of crimes
committed by NATO during its bombing campaign against the FRY.
The crimes alleged included that: NATO deliberately and unlawfully
attacked civilian infrastructure targets; NATO deliberately or reck-
lessly attacked the civilian population; and NATO deliberately or
recklessly caused excessive civilian casualties by trying to fight a
"zero casualty" war for their own side.'4 The allegations arose from
various sources, including academics, a Russian Parliamentary
Commission, and the FRY itself."
On June 2, 2000, the Prosecutor for the Tribunal, Carla Del Ponte,
advised the United Nations Security Council of her decision that
13. See generally UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME AND UNITED
NATIONS CENTRE FOR HUMAN SETTLEMENTS (HABITAT), THE Kosovo CONFLICT:
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT & HUMAN SETTLEMENTS, U.N. Sales No.
E.00.III.D.98 (1999); Ida L. Bostian, Hazardous Materials and Energy: The Envi-
ronmental Consequences of the Kosovo Conflict and the NA TO Bombing of Serbia,
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1999 Y.B. 230 (2000).
14. See Final Report, supra note 2, para. 2 (detailing NATO's alleged crimes).
15. Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor's Report on the NATO Bombing Campaign
(June 13, 2000) [hereinafter ICTY Press Release].
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there was no basis for investigating the allegations of crimes com-
mitted by NATO personnel during the campaign, indicating that
"[a]lthough NATO had made some mistakes, it had not deliberately
targeted civilians."" A representative of the Russian Federation im-
mediately challenged the decision as premature, and also expressed
reservations about the politicization of the Tribunal's work." In ad-
dition, the FRY's then Information Minister suggested that the Tri-
bunal was siding with the aggressor, and that it had become an ac-
complice to NATO's crimes."
The Prosecutor rejected the claim of politicization, and subse-
quently released the committee report on which the decision was
based ("Final Report").' She stated that this was an unusual step, as
reasons for the Tribunal's decisions were not ordinarily made avail-
able to the public in the absence of an indictment. She also explained
that the Final Report represented the culmination of an extensive
factual examination and legal analysis performed by a committee
established in May 1999 specifically to review the bombing cam-
paign ("Committee")."' The Committee's criteria in determining
whether an investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor was war-
ranted were as follows:
a) the existence of alleged prohibitions that are sufficiently well-
established as violations of international humanitarian law to form
the basis of a prosecution;
b) application of the law to the particular facts that reasonably
suggests that a violation of these prohibitions may have occurred;
and
16. Press Release, U.N. SCOR, Prosecutor for International Tribunal Briefs
Security Council, U.N. Doc. SC/6870 (June 2, 2000).
17. Id.
18. UN Wire, War Crimes: UN Declares "No Basts'"/or Opening .N TO
Probe (June 5, 2000). at http:i, ww.unfoundation.org/unwire/archives/
UNWIRE000605.cfm# 19.
19. See generally Final Report. supra note 2.
20. ICTY Press Release, supra note 15. In addition to the general question of
target selection, the Committee specifically examined NATO's use of cluster
bombs and depleted uranium projectiles and the collateral environmental damage
inflicted by the campaign. These aspects of the Final Report are beyond the scope
of this essay.
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c) credible information that tends to show that crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal may have been committed by individuals
during the campaign.2
II. JUS AD BELLUM AND JUS IN BELLO
The phrasejus ad belum refers to the rules governing the use of
force, i.e. when resort to armed conflict is allowed; jus in bello refers
to the rules governing the actual conduct of armed conflict, i.e. what
behavior is allowed within a war, also known as the law of armed
conflict or international humanitarian law.22 Jus ad bellum is today
largely derived from the United Nations Charter. Article 2(4) of the
Charter prohibits members from using or threatening to use force
against "the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations., 23 This prohibition applies to all states because it has
become part of customary international law.24 Exceptions apply
where force is used in self-defense 5 or pursuant to a Security Coun-
cil Resolution. The rules ofjus in bello that are relevant to NATO's
bombing campaign will be discussed in Part III of this Essay below.
Many commentators have suggested that NATO's use of force
against the FRY was contrary to the United Nations Charter and in-
ternational law.27 Others have acknowledged the technical illegality
of NATO's actions while maintaining that they were nevertheless
21. Final Report, supra note 2, para 5.
22. See generally PETER MALANCZUK, MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 306-41 (7th ed. rev. 1997) (discussing the role of jus ad
bellum in international wars, civil wars, and the right to self-determination).
23. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
24. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 97
(June 27) (indicating that both the U.N. Charter and customary international law
"flow from a common fundamental principle outlawing the use of force in interna-
tional relations.").
25. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
26. See generally id. at arts. 39-51 (outlining U.N. Security Council procedures
when confronted by breaches of peace and acts of aggression).
27. Law and Right: When They Don't Fit Together, ECONOMIST, Apr. 3, 1999,
at 19-20; Gowned Warriors, ECONOMIST, May 15, 1999, at 52.
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"legitimate" in some other sense. ' Still others have suggested that
the NATO conduct assisted in the creation of a new right of hu-
manitarian intervention under customary international law.:' The In-
ternational Court of Justice is currently hearing several claims by the
FRY against various NATO countries alleging that their resort to
force was illegal,' although the FRY's claim against the United
States was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.'" While it is beyond the
scope of this Essay to assess the strength of the FRY's claims, it is
worth noting that on one view, if NATO's resort to force were itself
illegal, all of its forceful actions were illegal, including the entire
bombing campaign.1
2
The Tribunal has the power to prosecute persons responsible for
crimes against humanity when committed in armed conflicts;" thus,
its jurisdiction typically extends to questions arising under jus in
28. See, e.g., Kofi Annan, The Effectiveness oi the Internaional Rule oi Law in
Maintaining International Peace and Security. in CONTENDING VOICES, supra note
1, at 221; Michael Walzer, Kosovo, in CONTENDING VOICES, stupra note 1, at 333,
335; INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra note 11. at 186: ci Oh What a Lovely
War!, ECONOMIsT, Apr. 24, 1999, at 50.
29. See generally Dr. Klinton W. Alexander, NA TO's Intervention in Kosovo:
the Legal Case for Violating Yugoslavia 's National Sovereignty in the Absence Uf
Security Council Approval, 22 HOUs. J. INT'L L. 403 (2000) (arguing that nations
can no longer rely on the principles of non-intervention and national sovereignty to
protect them from the use of force when the State is committing gross human
rights violations against its own people): Bartram S. Brown, Humanitarian Inter-
vention and Kosovo: Humanitarian Intervention at a Crossroads, 41 W\I. &
MARY L. REV. 1683 (2000) (stressing that the use of force for humanitarian inter-
vention is legal but that the parties relying on the pnnciple, such as NATO and the
United States, must now more clearly define its application); Walter Gary Sharp,
Sr., Operation Allied Force: Reviewing the Lawifidness q ,A TO's Use vi Military
Force to Defend Kosovo, 23 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 295 (1999).
30. Press Release 99/17, International Court of Justice, Yugoslavia Institutes
Proceedings Against Ten States for Violation of the Obligation Not to Use Force
Against Another State and Requests the Court to Order that the Use of Force Cease
Immediately (Apr. 29, 1999), at http:/'www.ici-cij.org, icjwww/ipresscom/
iPressl999/ipresscom9917_19990429.htm; Gowned Warriors, supra note 27 at 52.
31. See Legality of the Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.S.). 1999 I.C.J. 1, para. 30
(June 2) (indicating that a State must accept jurisdiction of the court before the
merits of particular acts can be assessed).
32. Final Report, supra note 2, paras. 2, 30.
33. Id. at para. 31.
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bello, but notjus ad bellum. 4 Accordingly, the Final Report did not
assess the legality of NATO's resort to force.'5 In restricting its as-
sessment to the manner in which the bombing campaign was con-
ducted, the Committee implicitly rejected the view that individual
actions involved in circumstances where resort to force is itself un-
lawful are necessarily unlawful themselves. The Committee indi-
cated that it considered this separation of the two questions to be "in
accord with the most widely accepted and reputable legal opinion.
It is indeed generally recognized today thatjus in bello applies re-
gardless of whether the conflict itself is lawful or unlawful.17 This
recognition makes sense in logic and policy. If it were not so, an ag-
gressor (already prepared to initiate an unjust war) might feel free to
engage in outrageous methods of warfare - since all its actions
would in any case be regarded as unlawful. Moreover, if there are
moral limits to the principle of independent operation of jus in bello
and jus ad bellurn, they would tend to be applicable only in the re-
verse case, where a person engaged in a just war wished to use oth-
erwise unlawful means of armed conflict. For example, Walzer sug-
gests that, in extreme, catastrophic circumstances only, a response to
aggression might validly breach the usual rules about the conduct of
war.38 In the case of NATO's attack on the FRY, regardless of
whether the attack itself was lawful, NATO had no justification for
conducting the attack in an unlawful manner. No NATO member
states were subject to aggression by the FRY. If anything, NATO
had an obligation to apply humanitarian standards even more care-
34. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 41-88 (2d ed. rev. 1999) (discussing the complex
relationship between crimes against humanity and war crimes).
35. See Final Report, supra note 2, paras. 4, 31, 34 (affirming that the Tribu-
nal's jurisdiction is limited tojus in bello and therefore that the Committee "delib-
erately refrained" from investigating any of the jus ad belitm issues).
36. Id. at para. 34.
37. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1),
June 8, 1977, pmbl., 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; see also
MALANCZUK, supra note 22, at 306; Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and
Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391, 394 (1993); cf KARMA
NABULSI, JUS AD BELLUM/JUS IN BELLO, in CRIMES OF WAR (Roy Gutman &
David Rieff eds., 1999) at 223 [hereinafter KARMA NABULSI].
38. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 231-32 (2d ed. 1999).
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fully 9 in view of its assertion that the attack was warranted on hu-
manitarian grounds.4" Accordingly, the remainder of this Essay con-
centrates on the legality of NATO's conduct of the bombing cam-
paign rather than the resort to force itself.
II. NATO'S GENERAL OBLIGATIONS IN
RELATION TO CIVILIANS
A. THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 ("Fourth Geneva Con-
vention")4' provides specific requirements for the treatment of civil-
ians in the course of war. Although the Fourth Geneva Convention
relates mainly to particular classes of civilians,4" it does provide some
general protections to civilians as a whole. The 1977 Additional
Protocol I ("Additional Protocol I") to the Geneva Conventions4'
contains much more extensive protections for civilians, including
highly detailed provisions regarding the targeting of civilian popula-
tions. The Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I have
been widely ratified, and apply to "all cases of declared war or of any
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the
High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized
by one of them."" The FRY has ratified both the Fourth Geneva
39. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra note 11. at 165-66; Christine N.
Chinkin, Kosovo: A "Good" or "Bad" War?, 93 AMt. J. IN-L L. 841. 844 (1999);
cf Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law, 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 847, 855-56.
40. ROBERTSON, supra note 6, at 10-11, 22.
41. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Con-
vention].
42. For example, it relates to civilians in enemy teritory or occupied territory,
wounded and sick civilians, and families separated by fighting. See generally
GRETCHEN M. KEWLEY, EVEN WARS HAVE LIMITS: TilE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICTS 65-71 (2nd ed. 2000).
43. See generally Additional Protocol I. supra note 37.
44. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 2; see also Additional Pro-
tocol I, supra note 37, art. 1, para. 3 ("This Protocol, which supplements the Ge-
neva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protections of war victims, shall apply
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Convention and Additional Protocol I. Sixteen of the nineteen NATO
member countries are parties to Additional Protocol I - all but
France, Turkey, and the United States..4 All nineteen NATO member
countries are parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, some with
reservations. Thus, as NATO's bombing campaign escalated the
Kosovo crisis into an international armed conflict 6 the relevant pro-
visions regarding the treatment of civilians would seem to apply to
both the FRY and most NATO countries.
In its Final Report, the Committee noted that the United States and
France have not ratified Additional Protocol I, but recognized that
some of the provisions of Additional Protocol I might be part of
customary international law.47 Indeed, it is widely accepted that the
rules contained in the Fourth Geneva Convention and many of the
rules in Additional Protocol I have attained the status of customary
international law.4'8 Thus, non-parties are obliged to comply with
much of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I.
Moreover, the United States has expressly supported many of the
provisions of Additional Protocol I and has acknowledged that others
form part of customary international law.49 The United States ap-
peared to regard the conflict in the FRY as subject to international
humanitarian law when it proclaimed that the apparent beating by the
FRY of three captured American soldiers violated the Third Geneva
Convention of 1949.'o In addition, the United States and other NATO
in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to those Conventions.").
45. The sixteen countries (some of which have entered reservations to Addi-
tional Protocol I) are: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
46. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 16.
47. Final Report, supra note 2, paras. 15, 42.
48. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 177; see also AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 4, at 9; KARMA NABULSI, supra note 37, at 113-14;
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3.
49. Michael J. Matheson, Session One: The United States Position on the Re-
lation of Custoinaly International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the
1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419, 420 (1987); see also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 6.
50. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; see Murphy,
supra note 3, at 635.
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countries conducted their campaign planning in a manner cognizant
of their responsibilities under international law, for example, using
military lawyers to assess targeting proposals under the Geneva
Conventions."' Accordingly, it is appropriate in principle to regard
the Additional Protocol I rules relating to civilians as applicable to
the NATO campaign against the FRY.
B. PRINCIPLES OF ATTACK
1. Distinction
Article 48 of Additional Protocol I imposes an obligation on par-
ties to an armed conflict to distinguish between civilian populations
and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives,
and to direct operations solely against the latter. For the purposes of
Additional Protocol I, a civilian is any person other than medical per-
sonnel and chaplains who: (a) is not a member of the armed forces of
a party to the conflict, or of a militia group, volunteer corps or regu-
lar armed forces professing allegiance to a government or authority
not recognized by the detaining power; and (b) does not take up arms
spontaneously to resist invading forces.': Civilian objects are all ob-
jects that are not military objectives." Military objectives are those
objects which, by their nature, location, purpose or use, make an ef-
fective contribution to military action and whose total or partial de-
struction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the
time, offer a definite military advantage.) In the case of doubt about
whether an object normally dedicated to a civilian purpose, such as a
church or school, is being used for military action, it is to be pre-
sumed not to be so used.)5 This "rule of distinction" has been gener-
ally accepted, including by the United States,' as a rule of customary
51. Ignatieff, supra note 5, at 33-34; but see JUDAH, supra note 9, at 258 (not-
ing that military lawyers only rejected one target during the Kosovo intervention).
52. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 37. art. 50 (defining "civilians").
53. Additional Protocol I, supra note 37, art. 52, para. 1.
54. Id., art. 52, para. 2.
55. Id., art. 52, para. 3.
56. See MIDDLE EAST WATCH, NEEDLESS DEATHS IN THE GLLt WAR:
CIVILIAN CASUALTIES DURING THE AIR CAMPAIGN AND VIOLATIONS OF THI LAWS
OF WAR 30-31 (1991); see also Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The Principle of the
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international law.57
Article 51(7) of Additional Protocol I specifically prohibits the use
of civilians to render certain areas immune from military operations,
for example to shield military objectives from attacks. In the context
of the Kosovo conflict, this means that while NATO was obliged to
draw a distinction between civilians and combatants, the FRY could
not take advantage of this obligation by rounding up civilians to con-
vert military bases into civilian objects. At the same time, Article
51(8) of Additional Protocol I specifically provides that a violation
of these prohibitions does not release parties to the conflict from
their legal obligations with respect to civilians. Thus, NATO could
not point to actions of the FRY as justifying otherwise unlawful at-
tacks by NATO on civilians." Despite any use of civilians as shields,
NATO was required to comply with the rule of distinction as well as
the other Additional Protocol I rules for the protection of civilians.
2. Precaution
Additional Protocol I recognizes that military operations are likely
to inflict some damage upon civilians. Article 57 therefore imposes
specific obligations on parties to a conflict to take precautions to
avoid such incidental injuries, codifying pre-existing customary
law. 9 Parties must take "constant care" to spare the civilian popula-
tion, civilians, and civilian objects,6° including (in the case of air
strikes) taking all reasonable precautions to avoid the loss of civilian
lives and damage to civilian objects.6' Specific precautions to be
taken include:
(a) to do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be at-
tacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects but are military ob-
Militaty Objective in the Law of Armed Conflict, 8 U.S. AIR FORCE ACAD. J.
LEGAL STUD. 35, 43, 46 (1998).
57. A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 7 (1996); Robertson, supra
note 56, at 35
58. But see ROBERTSON, supra note 6, at 14 (explaining that Serbia exploited
NATO's efforts to avoid civilian casualties and insinuating that NATO's acts dur-
ing the air strikes should therefore be excused).
59. MIDDLE EAST WATCH, supra note 56, at 49.
60. Additional Protocol I, supra note 37, art. 57, para. 1.
61. Id. art. 57, para. 3.
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jectives;
(b) to take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and
methods of attack with a view to avoiding or minimizing incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects;
and
(c) to give effective advance warning of attacks that may affect the
civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. °:
3. Indiscriminate Attacks
Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I prohibits parties to a conflict
from engaging in indiscriminate attacks, being attacks that: are not
directed at a specific military objective; employ a method or means
of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective;
or employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot
be limited as required by Additional Protocol I, and that are, there-
fore, of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian
objects without distinction. Article 51(4) may be regarded as a resid-
ual protection, because engaging in indiscriminate attacks as defined
would likely breach other rules of Additional Protocol I. However,
this provision does suggest that a party cannot escape liability for
such a breach by blaming its own poor technology.
4. Proportionality
An indiscriminate attack includes any attack that may be expected
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, that would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."
This is related to the principle of proportionality under customary
and conventional international law'-the notion that parties must
attempt to ensure that any incidental damage caused to civilians by
an attack is proportionate to the military advantage to be attained. In
other words, parties to a conflict may only conduct attacks that are
militarily necessary, i.e. indispensable for ending the war by weak-
62. Id. art. 57, para. 2.
63. Id. art. 5 1, para. 5(b).
64. See Gardam, supra note 37, at 391 (defining "proportionality").
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ening the military forces of the enemy.6 Furthermore, the degree of
military necessity must be balanced against the interests of human-
ity. 66 Specifically, Article 57(2) of Additional Protocol I requires
parties to a conflict to:
(a) refrain from deciding to launch any attack that may be ex-
pected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, that would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated; and
(b) cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes apparent that the ob-
jective is not a military one or that the attack may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to ci-
vilian objects, or a combination thereof, that would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
Although there is some debate as to the extent to which the con-
cept of proportionality forms part of customary international law, in
practice it is generally accepted as a necessary part of the military
decision-making process.68
C. GENERAL ASSESSMENT
The political leaders of NATO spoke the language of ultimate commit-
ment and practiced the warfare of minimum risk. As commander, [Gen-
eral Wesley K. Clark] was placed in an often impossible position: being
asked to wage a war that was clean yet lethal, just yet effective, moral yet
ruthless. 69
Apart from certain allegations with respect to the bombing of the
Chinese Embassy,0 there is no suggestion that NATO deliberately or
65. See A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 3-6 (1996) (defining and
discussing the concept of "military necessity").
66. Id. at 14.
67. Additional Protocol I, supra note 37, art. 57, para. 2.
68. William J. Fenrick, Justice in Cataclysm Criminal Trials in the Wake o/
Mass Violence: Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Qffense, 7 DUK[ J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 539, 545 (1997).
69. Ignatieff, supra note 5, at 36.
70. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
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intentionally targeted civilians in its campaign. So much was agreed
on by the Committee7' and the Commission.~: Nevertheless, refrain-
ing from intentionally targeting civilians was only one of NATO's
obligations during the bombing campaign.I A more crucial question
is whether NATO's planning, rules of engagement and methods of
attack complied in general with the rules of distinction, precaution
and proportionality, and against indiscriminate attacks.
As highlighted above, NATO itself took serious account of the
need to avoid civilian casualties in its planning and target selection
process.74 Decision-makers in the campaign included not only NATO
members and NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana," but also
(particularly in the case of operations using sensitive American as-
sets such as planes with stealth technology) the United States Penta-
gon, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President Clinton, and other high-level
Defense Department officials." These decision-makers established
and made daily use of a comprehensive computerized target devel-
opment and review system during the NATO campaign, assessing
military significance, possible collateral damage, and legal and moral
obligations. 77 However, in most cases, pilots and weapons system of-
ficers were not in a position to verify that the targets remained le-
gitimate. For example, the pilots were generally unable to obtain vis-
ual confirmation that civilians had not moved into the target area
before the planes approached. Amnesty International criticized
NATO for focusing on the planning phase without giving enough
attention to subsequent verification, by the attacking force, to ensure
71. Final Report, supra note 2, para. 54.
72. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra note 11. at 180.
73. See discussion supra Part III.A.
74. ROBERTSON, supra note 6. at 14-15, 24-25: see also HuMAN\ RlicHTS
WATCH, supra note 3, at 12 ("From the v'ery beginning of Operation Allied Force,
minimizing civilian casualties was a major declared NATO concern."): see Clark,
supra note 7, at 253; but see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. supra note 4, at 12 (not-
ing that NATO did not publicly state which rules were being applied and how they
were being interpreted).
75. JUDAH, supra note 9, at 237: Clark. supra note 7. at 253.
76. Ignatieff, supra note 5, at 30-31, 34; see also JUDAH, supra note 9, at 266-
69.
77. Ignatieff, supra note 5, at 33.
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the intelligence relied on was accurate and up to date."'
As a method of warfare, aerial bombardment is ill-adapted to
comply with the rules of distinction and proportionality, and against
indiscriminate attacks. In some circumstances, the tactic may itself
be a disproportionate method of achieving a military objective. 79 If
aerial bombardment is used, the need to take all reasonable precau-
tions to prevent civilian casualties (for example, in selecting targets
and weapons and in determining flight patterns and times) becomes
crucial. A common criticism of the NATO campaign was that it rep-
resented a "zero casualty war" for NATO, reflected in its decision to
conduct high-altitude bombing, to avoid a ground war,"' and in the
actual result of zero NATO casualties."' While NATO airplanes did
sometimes fly below 15,000 feet,8 2 at least in the first half of the
campaign that was the minimum height determined by the rules of
engagement."3 Once a target was determined, pilots could attack only
on visual recognition of the target 4, but not necessarily on confirma-
tion of its appropriateness as a target. Typically, this involved
searching for the Designated Mean Point of Impact ("DMPI")
through two four-inch-square target monitors." In some cases, lower-
level flying may not have increased the pilot's ability to distinguish
between civilian objects and military objectives, so flying at 15,000
feet would not of itself affect the legality of the conduct of the cam-
paign. However, in other cases it appears that flying lower would in-
deed have made it easier for pilots to identify civilians and avoid or
minimize incidental loss of life or civilian property. 6
78. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 4, at 18-19.
79. Gardam, supra note 37, at 407.
80. Walzer, supra note 38, at 334.
81. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 181; see Messy War. Messy
Peace, ECONOMIST, June 12, 1999 at 15.
82. ROBERTSON, supra note 6, at 25; see Ignatieff, supra note 5, at 35.
83. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 4, at 16; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 3, at 10.
84. Ignatieff, supra note 5, at 34.
85. See id. at 30, 34.
86. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 2; see AMNESTY INTFRNATIONAL,
supra note 4, at 17.
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The Commission considered that the "high-altitude tactic...
weaken[s] the claim of humanitarianism to the extent that it appears
to value the lives of the NATO combatants more than those of the
civilian population in Kosovo and Serbia."'- Nevertheless, it consid-
ered that despite a series of mistakes, the overall low level of civilian
damage was unprecedented:
The Commission is impressed by the relatively small scale of ciilian
damage considering the magnitude of the war and its duration. It is further
of the view that NATO succeeded better than any air %%ar in histor) in se-
lective targeting that adhered to principles of discrimination, proporion-
ality, and necessity, with only relatively minor breaches that were them-
selves reasonable interpretations of"military necessity" in the context."
NATO itself also referred to the "remarkably few civilian casual-
ties" resulting from the campaign."v Yet, while NATO cannot be
criticized for improving on the level of "collateral damage" inflicted
by its campaign compared with previous conflicts, congratulations
are not necessarily in order. NATO's use of precision-guided muni-
tions in approximately one-third of its attacks" ' and its computerized
target-planning system might explain a reduction in the level of col-
lateral damage. However, the fact remains that in several cases
NATO's attacks were difficult to justify under the laws of armed
conflict. In addition, the civilian toll may have been relatively low,
but the absence of a single allied casualty is even more striking. In-
deed, Elshtain goes so far as to suggest that the manner in which this
war was conducted turned the principle of civilian immunity into a
principle of combatant immunity.' If NATO has improved on past
conduct, there is room for much greater improvement.
87. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 181; "ee Falk, supra note 39,
at 856 (stating that NATO's tactics shifted the risk of harm from the intervening
NATO forces onto the civilian population of the FRY, thus seriously damaging the
humanitarian rationale).
88. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra note 11. at 183-84.
89. ROBERTSON, supra note 6, at 22; see also JUDAH, supra note 9. at 259 (re-
peating NATO officials' claim that "fewer accidents happened in this war than in
almost any other one in history.").
90. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 4. at 24.
91. Elshtain, supra note 1, at 365.
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IV. REEVALUATING THE CONDUCT OF THE
CAMPAIGN: FIVE ATTACKS
The Committee reviewed twenty-one specific incidents alleged to
involve NATO crimes, 92 and focused on the five incidents that it con-
sidered most problematic.9' These incidents provide an array of fac-
tual circumstances involving civilian casualties, and a valuable in-
sight into the thinking of NATO as well as the Committee. The
Committee recommended that the Prosecutor not commence an in-
vestigation into any of these incidents, but in most cases offered lim-
ited reasoning for its decision, as outlined below.
A. PASSENGER TRAIN AT GRDELICA GORGE
On April 12, 1999, a NATO aircraft launched a laser-guided bomb
towards the Leskovac railway bridge in eastern Serbia. The mission
was to destroy the bridge, which was allegedly part of a communica-
tions supply network being used by FRY forces in Kosovo. Accord-
ing to NATO, 4 after launching the bomb, the person controlling the
weapon95 (the "controller") saw movement on the bridge but was Lin-
able to dump the bomb, which then struck a civilian passenger train
traveling over the bridge. The controller saw that the bridge had not
been hit and launched a second bomb at the opposite end of the
bridge. At this time the bridge was "covered with smoke and
clouds.''96 The bomb hit the train, which had slid forward as a result
of the original impact.97 At least ten people were killed, and at least
fifteen were injured.
A United States Defense Department official expressed regret for
92. See Final Report, supra note 2, para. 9 (cataloging each of the incidents by
date and by the number of civilians killed or injured).
93. Id. at para. 57.
94. See id. at para. 60 (describing how a German national casts some doubt on
NATO's version of events).
95. There was some dispute about whether this person was the pilot or a second
crew-member (a Weapons System Officer). Final Report, supra note 2, paras. 59-
60.
96. Id. at para. 59.
97. Id. at para. 58.
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the accident," while NATO General Wesley Clark offered similar
sentiments." NATO's explanation focused on the fact that the attack
was "remotely directed." In other words, the controller could not see
the bridge with his naked eye from his position in the aircraft, but
saw the bridge only by viewing it on a five-inch screen. The con-
troller's focus on the aim point within that screen meant that he only
saw the train appear (on both occasions) when he had already locked
the bomb on target.'O'
The Committee accepted NATO's claim that the controller was
targeting the bridge and not the train, and determined that the bridge
was a legitimate military objective."" While the Committee was di-
vided as to "whether there was an element of recklessness in the
conduct" of the controller in launching the second bomb, it deter-
mined that neither the first nor the second attack should be investi-
gated by the Office of the Prosecutor.'" It stated that this decision
was based on the relevant criteria identified above," but did not
specify which of the criteria had not been met in this case.
NATO's bombing of the Leskovak railway bridge is a deeply
troubling example of NATO's approach to the campaign against the
FRY. NATO's response to the incident appeared to suggest that the
civilian casualties could be excused because the method of attack,
aerial bombing via remote direction, prohibited verification of the
target as a military objective. Even assuming that the bridge was a
legitimate military target (but for the temporary presence of civilians
in the train), it is difficult to reconcile this suggestion with the laws
of armed conflict. If the bombing method used did not allow the
98. See id. at para. 59 (quoting U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre in
the aftermath of the incident).
99. See Final Report, supra note 2, para. 59 (quoting Gen. Wesley Clark,
NATO's Supreme Allied Commander for Europe: .'t was an unfortunate incident
which [the controller], and the crew, and all of us very much regret.. it was
really unfortunate.").
100. See id. at para. 59 (contending that before both impacts. the controller re-
alized only belatedly that the bomb would hit the train).
101. Id. atparas. 61-62.
102. Id. at para. 62.
103. See supra Part I (listing the three criteria the Committee utilized to deter-
mine if further investigation was required).
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controller to identify the target or distinguish between the target and
civilians, it is arguable that it should not have been used, as it would
violate the rule of distinction and amount to an indiscriminate attack.
In fact, it seems unlikely that the method prevented verification of
the target. There is no evidence in the relevant reports that the pilot
was unable to fly over the targeted bridge first to verify that there
were no civilians or civilian objects in the area."'" An earlier review
at the planning stage of the passenger train timetables or movements,
and advance warning to civilians, could also have reduced the risk to
civilian lives. The apparent failure to take any of these measures con-
stituted a breach of NATO's obligations to take all reasonable pre-
cautions to avoid loss of civilian life and damage to civilian objects.
The launch of the second bomb in this incident is even more
problematic. After the initial launch, the controller was aware of the
presence of civilians in the area and, presumably, the direction in
which the train was traveling. Therefore, the impossibility of viewing
the whole bridge on a tiny screen provides even less justification for
launching the second bomb than the first. Moreover, the fact that the
bridge was now obscured by smoke does not exonerate the controller
for hitting the train a second time. On the contrary, the covering of
smoke should have made the controller even more hesitant to con-
tinue-he was required to take "constant care" to spare civilians.""
As Amnesty International points out, NATO's explanation of the
second bombing suggests that the controller understood the mission
to be to destroy the bridge, regardless of the cost in civilian casual-
ties.' °6 Such a failure to balance the civilian cost against the military
advantage to be achieved by the mission violates the rule of propor-
tionality. There was no suggestion by NATO that any anticipated
concrete and direct military advantage in this case outweighed the
incidental cost to civilians of bombing the train. Accordingly, it had
a specific obligation under Article 57(2) of Additional Protocol I to
cancel or suspend the attack once the presence of civilians became
apparent.
104. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 4, at 31-32.
105. Additional Protocol I, supra note 37, art. 57, para. 1.
106. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 4, at 3 1.
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B. DJAKOVICA CONVOY
On April 14, 1999, NATO bombs targeted a convoy of Albanian
refugees traveling on the Djakovica-Prizren road.'"" This road was an
important supply and reinforcement route for the Yugoslav Army
and the Yugoslav Special Police Forces ("MUP"), and NATO later
claimed the MUP had been conducting ethnic cleansing operations in
the area in preceding days. ' That morning, NATO forces claimed to
have seen a series of burning villages, and concluded that the MUP
and the Yugoslav military ("V") were working through them, set-
ting them alight and expelling the Kosovar Albanians. At around
1030 hours, a NATO pilot saw uniformly dark green vehicles that
appeared to be troop transports near the freshest burning house. Two
F-16s bombed the convoy, hitting the lead vehicle and others. A third
NATO aircraft dropped several bombs on a nearby convoy identified
as a VJ convoy. NATO continued its aerial attack for two and a half
hours, '°9 until 1300 hours, when an order was apparently issued sus-
pending further attacks until the target could be verified."" Around
seventy to seventy-five people were killed in this incident, and
around one hundred injured.'
The NATO aircraft involved in this incident were flying at an al-
titude of 15,000 feet or higher, in order to avoid Yugoslav air de-
fenses, and the pilots viewed their targets with the naked eye rather
than remotely.'12 NATO claimed that while the cockpit video re-
vealed that the vehicles attacked appeared to be tractors, when
viewed with the naked eye from that altitude, they looked like mili-
tary vehicles, due to their movement, size, shape, color, spacing and
speed. In any case, there had been reports of Yugoslav forces using
107. I have largely relied on the facts as stated by the Committee in the Final
Report. See Final Report, supra note 2, paras. 63-64 (stating that the "'precise facts
concerning this incident are difficult to determine", and that the Committee as-
sumed "the facts most appropriate to a successful prosecution").
108. Id. at para. 64.
109. See id. at para. 65 (describing the attack).
110. Id. at para. 67.
111. Id. at para. 63.
112. Final Report, supra note 2, para. 64.
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civilian vehicles."' Nevertheless, Human Rights Watch reported that
NATO subsequently changed its rules of engagement so that military
vehicles intermingled with civilian vehicles were not to be attacked,
suggesting that "the alliance recognized that it had taken insufficient
precautions in mounting this attack."' 
14
The Committee concluded that NATO did not deliberately attack
civilians in this incident and that no investigation was warranted:
While there is nothing unlawful about operating at a height above Yugo-
slav air defences, it is difficult for any aircrew operating an aircraft flying
at several hundred miles an hour and at a substantial height to distinguish
between military and civilian vehicles in a convoy .... While this incident
is one where it appears the air crews could have benefited from lower al-
titude scrutiny of the target at an early stage, the committee is of the
opinion that neither the aircrew nor their commanders displayed the de-
gree of recklessness in failing to take precautionary measures which
would sustain criminal charges."'
The Committee seemed to be influenced by the fact that the attacks
ceased as soon as the presence of civilians was suspected, because
they emphasized it twice.'
It seems clear, from NATO's own explanation of this incident, that
if the pilots had flown down below 15,000 feet, perhaps as low as
5,000 feet,"7 they would have recognized the vehicles in the target
area as tractors rather than military vehicles. In other words, they
would have been able to fulfill their obligation to distinguish be-
tween civilian objects and military objectives. By employing a means
of combat that did not enable them to do so, NATO was arguably
engaging in an indiscriminate attack under Article 51(4)(c) of Addi-
tional Protocol I. Not only was such an attack "of a nature" to strike
military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinc-
113. Id. at para. 67.
114. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 23, cited in Final Report, supra
note 2, para. 68. See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 4, at 17 (indicat-
ing that after this incident, NATO altered its rules of engagement to require visual
confirmation that civilians were not in the target area before beginning an attack).
115. Id. at paras. 69-70.
116. Id.
117. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 4, at 17.
1104 [16:1083
THE NA TO BOMBL.VG iLv Kosovo
tion-it actually did so. While flying low enough to verify the target
may have involved some additional risk to the pilots, it was up to
NATO to determine whether the target was sufficiently important to
warrant taking that additional risk."' Whether the target was suffi-
ciently important could have been determined as a preliminary mat-
ter at the planning stage, and then reviewed at the stage of execution
based on the pilot's assessment of the immediate situation. If it was
not sufficiently important, in circumstances where there was a real
danger of incidental damage to civilians or civilian objects if the tar-
gets were misidentified, the attack should not have been carried
out." 9 In carrying out the attack at such a high altitude that proper
target verification was impossible, NATO failed to take all feasible
precautions to minimize civilian injury and damage in violation of
Article 57(2) of Additional Protocol I and. once again, unduly fa-
vored military over civilian lives in breach of the rule of proportion-
ality.
C. SERBIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION STATION
During the night of April 23, 1999, NATO intentionally bombed
the central radio and television studio of the Serbian broadcasting
corporation. Between ten and seventeen civilians were killed. NATO
claimed the attack was legitimate because of the FRY's use of the
station for military purposes, with military traffic being routed
through the civilian system, and due to its role as a component of the
FRY's command, control and communications network.'" In addi-
tion, NATO suggested that the bombing was justified because the
broadcast facilities were part of President Milosevic's control
mechanism and the propaganda machinery supporting its war ef-
fort.
21
The Committee determined that, to the extent that the attack was
directed at disrupting the FRY's communications network, the sta-
118. See A.V.P. Rogers, Zero-Casualt" War/are. INT'L Rt-v. RED CROSs, March
2000, at 165, 179 (arguing that if there was any doubt about the validity or neces-
sity of a target, NATO should not have carried out the attack).
119. But see Walzer, supra note 28, at 334-35 (describing the moral political ar-
gument for intervening in cases such as this).
120. Final Report, supra note 2, paras. 72-73.
121. Id. at para. 74.
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tion was a legitimate target. 22 However, it stated that using the sta-
tion's propaganda role to justify the attack "might well be questioned
by some experts in the field of international humanitarian law."'21
The Committee considered, nevertheless, that any such justification
was incidental to the primary goal of disabling the FRY's military
command and control system.'24 Without stating definitively that the
station was a legitimate target, the Committee continued its analysis
on the assumption that it was. In contrast, Amnesty International
suggested not only that the target was a civilian object,"2 5 but also that
the attack proceeded in the face of dispute within NATO itself as to
the legality of the target.1 26 The Commission regarded such an attack
on the basis of propaganda as "politically unwise and legally dubi-
ous."'127 Similarly, Human Rights Watch questioned the legitimacy of
the target, and reflected that even if civilian radio and television con-
stituted a legitimate target, there were no apparent reasons for at-
tacking urban studios rather than transmitters.'
2
1
In 1956, the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC")
compiled a list of acceptable military objectives, including the in-
stallations of broadcasting and television stations "of fundamental
military importance."'' 29 The station might well have met that crite-
rion in terms of its function in military communications. Although by
its nature it would not ordinarily contribute to military action, it is
possible that it was in fact used in contributing to military action and
that its partial destruction or neutralization offered a definite military
advantage as required by Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I.
However, the fact that the station may have been used to broadcast
FRY propaganda (for example, in support of President Milosevic or
against NATO) is indirectly connected to military action at best. It
would be extremely difficult for NATO to uphold its claim of legiti-
122. Id. at para. 75.
123. Id. at para. 76.
124. Id. at para. 76.
125. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 4, at 25.
126. Id. at 13.
127. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 221.
128. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 27.
129. Final Report, para. 39.
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macy on that basis.
Assuming that the station was a legitimate military objective (to
the extent that it was involved in military communications as claimed
by NATO), the attack appears to have breached the rule of propor-
tionality. The attack only interrupted broadcasting for a few hours
during the night, as NATO had predicted. The Committee neverthe-
less considered that while the civilian casualties were "unfortunately
high," they were not clearly disproportionate. It determined it neces-
sary to focus not on the isolated attack on the station, but on the at-
tack's role as part of an integrated strategy of targeting the Yugoslav
command and control network as a whole. On that basis, it recom-
mended that the Prosecutor not commence an investigation into the
attack. 30 However, even accepting that the attack was part of an inte-
grated strategy, it must have played a minimal role, given the prompt
re-commencement of broadcasting. It is difficult to see how such a
short interruption could achieve a degree of military advantage justi-
fying the sacrifice of seventeen civilian lives.
There was some dispute as to the advance warnings of the strike
given by NATO. Amnesty International suggested that NATO had
indicated it did not give any specific warning to avoid danger to its
pilots, although Western journalists reportedly were advised by a
CNN contact to stay away from the station."' The families of civil-
ians killed later commenced legal proceedings against station man-
agement, alleging that management was aware of the impending at-
tack and chose not to advise their employees, presumably "to arouse
Western anger, cause dissension in NATO ranks and rally support at
home for the continued defence of the nation."' 2 The Committee ap-
peared to conclude that the fact that some Western journalists were
advised of the attack meant that NATO had issued a warning to their
employers, that Yugoslav officials were also aware of the attack, and
that the advance notice by NATO was sufficient in the circum-
stances. I
130. See id. at paras. 77-79.
131. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. supra note 4. at 15: Final Report, supra note 2,
para. 77.
132. JUDAH, supra note 9, at 261.
133. See Final Report, supra note 2. para. 77.
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If NATO did not in fact warn anyone of the attack, it almost cer-
tainly breached its obligation to take precautions against civilian in-
jury. Although Article 57(2) of Additional Protocol I removes the
need to give warnings where "circumstances do not permit," a blan-
ket NATO policy against warnings to avoid risk to pilots would not
qualify for such an exemption. NATO does not seem to have pro-
vided any specific justification for a failure to warn in this case.
Furthermore, if NATO warned CNN and/or Yugoslav officials of the
attack, it would still arguably fall short of its duty to give "effective"
advance warnings. The effectiveness of the warning needs to be
judged against whether civilians as a group are made aware of the
attack, not just Western civilians. Only if NATO actually warned
Western civilians likely to be affected, either via CNN or some other
means, and did everything feasible to warn Yugoslav civilians,
would it have discharged its obligation under international law.
D. CHINESE EMBASSY
On May 7, 1999, several NATO missiles hit the Chinese Embassy
in Belgrade.'3 4 Three Chinese citizens were killed in this attack, and
approximately fifteen injured. Extensive damage was also caused to
the embassy and surrounding buildings. Both NATO and the United
States government, through the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"),
stated that the Chinese Embassy was hit by mistake; the intended
target was the Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and Pro-
curement, considered a legitimate target due to its role in military
procurement.'35 The mistake allegedly arose from the land navigation
techniques used to locate the intended target, and the inaccuracy of
military and intelligence databases used to verify target informa-
tion.'36 In addition, although at a late stage mid-level intelligence of-
ficers apparently suspected that the target had been wrongly identi-
fied, the problem was not brought to the attention of senior managers
who might have been able to intervene.
The Chinese government and many of its citizens were outraged
by the attack. Violent protests took place in Beijing and normal busi-
134. Id. at para. 80.
135. Id.
136. Id. at para. 81; see generally Ignatieff, supra note 3, at 34.
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ness with the United States was suspended.' The Committee noted
that NATO and various United States government representatives,
including President Clinton,'" had issued a formal apology to the
Chinese government and had agreed to pay S28 million in compen-
sation to the government and $4.5 million to the families of the dead
and injured. The Committee also referred to U.S. govermnent claims
that it had taken disciplinary and corrective actions to prevent such
mistakes in future. 3 "
The Committee found that although the Chinese Embassy was
"clearly a civilian object and not a legitimate military' objective,"""
neither aircrew nor senior military commanders involved in the at-
tack should be assigned responsibility since neither group was re-
sponsible for providing the inaccurate target information. Therefore,
the Committee recommended that the Prosecutor conduct no investi-
gation.141 Strangely, although the Committee stated expressly that
NATO had not deliberately targeted civilians in the incidents at
Grdelica Gorge and Djakovica, it made no such specific finding in
the Chinese Embassy bombing incident. The Committee nevertheless
appeared to accept the United States claim that the bombing was ac-
cidental, and examined the reasons for the accident in detail. There is
no suggestion in its Final Report that the Committee considered
claims that the bombing was in fact deliberate, despite suggestions
from some quarters (including China itself):4 Z that this was the case.""
There may be no way of ever knowing whether the attack on the
Chinese Embassy was deliberate. If it was, there is no question that
this would violate numerous laws of armed conflict, as the Embassy
137. Bombs in Belgrade, Bricks in Beijing, EcONOMIST. May 15, 1999, at 41;
America Says Sor, Again, ECONOMIST, Jun 19, 1999, at 39.
138. See Bombs in Belgrade, Bricks in Beijing, supra note 137, at 41.
139. Final Report, supra note 2, para. 84.
140. Id. at para. 84.
141. Id. at para. 85.
142. Anger in China, ECONOMIST, May 15, 1999, at 15: Bombs in Belgrade,
Bricks in Beijing, supra note 137, at 41: see generally ..lnertca Savs Sorr. Again,
supra note 138, at 39.
143. John Sweeney et al., A TO Bombed Chinese Deliberately, TIi GL, \RDIA\,
Oct. 17, 1999, at 1; see also Truth Behind America's Raid on Belgrade, THE
GUARDIAN, Nov. 28, 1999 at 4.
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was clearly a civilian object and there was no claimed military ad-
vantage in attacking it. However, even assuming that the attack was a
mistake, the fact that such a mistake could be made at all suggests se-
rious problems with the NATO campaign. In particular, it suggests
that NATO took inadequate precautions in the planning process to
ensure that its information was valid, and paid insufficient attention
to verifying the nature and location of the target once it had been
determined. It would have been a fairly simple exercise to verify the
location of the target on the ground, or at least to verify that the data-
bases and maps relied on had been created using reliable methods.
NATO did not meet its obligation to do "everything feasible" to ver-
ify the nature of the target in this case.' 41 In addition, NATO's subse-
quent determination to continue the bombing campaign using the
same faulty maps and databases rather than suspending the campaign
until they had been remedied 4 suggests a failure to take seriously the
rules of proportionality and precautions in subsequent bombing.
E. KORI A VILLAGE
On May 14, 1999, NATO aircraft dropped ten bombs on the vil-
lage of Koriga, killing up to eighty-seven civilians, mainly refugees,
and injuring approximately sixty others. NATO maintained that a
nearby Serbian military camp and command post were the primary
targets, and therefore that the bombing was legitimate.46 The attack
took place in the dark, beginning at 2330 hours. 47 NATO explained
that:
the pilot ... had to visually identify [the target] ... and you know it was
by night, so he did see silhouettes of vehicles on the ground and as it was
by prior intelligence a valid target, he did do the attack ... SoJbr the pilot
flying the attack, it was a legitimate target... Of course, and we have to
be very fair, we are talking at night. If there is anybody sleeping some-
where in a house, you would not be able to see it from the perspective of a
pilot. But once again, don't misinterpret it. It was a military target which
had been used since the beginning of conflict over there and we have all
144. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 37, at art. 57(2) (laying out this stan-
dard of verification).
145. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 4, at 53-54.
146. Id. at para. 86.
147. Id. at para. 87.
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sources used to identify this target in order to make sure that this target
was still a valid target when it was attacked.'"
The Committee emphasized, as NATO did, that the attack oc-
curred at night and that the military camp and command post were
legitimate military objectives. It acknowledged NATO's claim that it
had taken all practicable precautions to determine civilians were not
present, and that NATO believed the area to be completely cleared of
civilians. The Committee also stated that "[t]here is some informa-
tion indicating that displaced Kosovar civilians were forcibly con-
centrated within a military camp in the village of Koriga as human
shields and that Yugoslav military forces may thus be at least par-
tially responsible for the deaths there."'" Although it found that a
"relatively large number of civilians were killed," the Committee
determined that there was insufficient credible information to tend to
show a crime by the aircrew or their superiors within the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal. '"
As mentioned above, the possibility of Yugoslav forces using ci-
vilians as military shields has little or no bearing on NATO's obliga-
tions to avoid targeting civilians. NATO was required under Article
51(8) of Additional Protocol I to comply with the rule of distinction
regardless of how or why civilians might come to be in the target
area. Despite NATO's repeated references to the attack being con-
ducted in the dark of night, this fact also provides no reason for low-
ering the standards applicable to its actions. NATO took the decision
to attack at night with full knowledge of the difficulties this would
create in identifying the target and distinguishing civilians. It was not
enough for the pilot to identify silhouettes of vehicles on the ground
and attack on the basis that the presence of vehicles was consistent
with prior intelligence that labeled the area a legitimate military tar-
get. Amnesty International determined that it was unclear whether or
not FRY forces or military installations were present in Koriga at the
time of the bombing. However, assuming that the target would have
been a military objective were it not for the presence of civilians,
148. Id. at para 88 (quoting a NATO General) (emphasis added in original).
149. Id.; see also ROBERTSON, supra note 6. at 14 (referring to the "cynical Serb
use of... human shields.").
150. Final Report, supra note 2, para. 89.
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NATO should have taken precautions in accordance with Article
57(2) to confirm that the target remained legitimate and that there
were no or few civilians present.'"' Such precautions could have in-
cluded conducting the attack in daylight, obtaining updated intelli-
gence about the area, and attacking from a lower altitude.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the conduct of NATO's
bombing campaign against the FRY in early 1999 entailed several
breaches of the laws of armed conflict with respect to civilians.
While these breaches may not necessarily be of a kind suitable for
prosecution by the Tribunal, whether due to an absence of evidence,
an absence of identifiable individuals who can be properly held ac-
countable, or for jurisdictional reasons, they should not be forgotten.
A key factor leading to the breaches was that NATO was conducting
a war on humanitarian grounds, sanctioned not by the United Nations
but by the public in NATO member countries. As "public support for
intervention was conditioned on the prospect of minimal casualties"
for members,'52 in too many cases NATO appeared to give absolute
precedence to the lives of its forces over those of the civilian popula-
tion, including the Kosovar Albanians it was fighting to protect.
Thus, in several incidents the primary beneficiaries of NATO's pre-
cision weapons technology were the aircrew, who were able to direct
attacks from higher altitudes at lower risk to themselves, rather than
the civilians.
There is no easy way to measure the life of a NATO pilot against
that of a Serbian or Kosovar Albanian civilian, and NATO com-
manders had a responsibility to both. However, NATO's responses
to many cases of civilian casualties and damage indicated a misun-
derstanding of, or an unwillingness to abide by, its obligations to ci-
vilians under international law. Although NATO apparently at-
tempted to minimize incidental damage to civilians at the planning
stage, it paid insufficient attention to verifying the information it re-
151. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 23-24 (describing how the
attack on the Koriga village was not in compliance with the rules laid out in the
Protocol about verifying the presence of civilians).
152. Falk, supra note 39, at 851; see also Clark, supra note 7, at 253.
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lied on at that stage, and to ensuring that each target remained a le-
gitimate military objective right up to the point of attack (for exam-
ple, by requiring meaningful confirmation by the pilots of the ab-
sence of civilians). In explaining accidents involving civilians,
NATO referred to the difficult conditions of attack, such as high al-
titude, darkness and small video screens, shirking its responsibility
for choosing to act under those conditions. As Amnesty International
has recommended, NATO must learn from the civilian losses that it
imposed in the Kosovo conflict by ensuring that all of its member
states accede to Additional Protocol I and commit to the highest
standards of international humanitarian law." NATO also should re-
fine its command structure and review its rules of engagement in the
light of the need to verify targets to the extent possible.
At a broader international level, the civilian casualties of the
NATO bombing reveal the critical need for development of the laws
of armed conflict in the context of humanitarian intervention. As
evidenced by the Kosovo conflict, the temptation in such cases may
be to reduce the risk to the military in combat at the expense of ci-
vilians. The Commission has suggested that the ICRC, or other ap-
propriate expert body, prepare a new legal convention covering UN
peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention.f4 Such a convention
would need to make clear that the laws of armed conflict apply
equally, or even more strictly, to conflicts in the name of peace or
humanity. A "zero casualty" policy is unlikely to comply with these
laws, and the risk of injury or death for military personnel may there-
fore be higher than it was for NATO pilots in Kosovo. This may
mean that humanitarian intervention in some cases becomes politi-
cally infeasible. However undesirable such a result may be, it cannot
justify a selective approach of the laws of armed conflict.
153. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 4. at 12.
154. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra note 11. at 184.
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